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It is not unusual these days to have a group of economists gather to discuss their research on 
crime. In Europe and the Americas, a critical mass of  academic economists have specialized in 
the study of crime and its control, and there is now a steady flow of economics doctoral 
dissertations on this topic. As we near the 50th anniversary of Gary Becker’s seminal contribution 
to this field (Becker, 1968), it is fair to say that the economics of crime is no longer a “fringe” 
topic, but part of the standard portfolio that makes up economics. 
 
Among the markers of progress are these: 
 
• The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) created a working group on crime 
that has had regular meetings since 2007 and published an edited conference volume in 
2011 (Cook, Ludwig, and McCrary);   
• A new organization within LACEA (the Latin American and Caribbean Economic 
Association), with the acronym AL CAPONE (The America Latina Crime and Policy 
Network) held its first annual meeting in 2011;1 
• The Transatlantic Workshop on the Economics of Crime has been running annually since 
20009 (Paris 2009, Bonn 2010, Torino 2011, Rotterdam 2012); 
• John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York City recently added an economics 
department, while think tanks like the Vera Institute of Justice and the Urban Institute are 
producing cost-benefit assessments of crime-control programs; 
• Leading economics journals in Britain and the United States have been publishing crime 
papers on a regular basis for 40 years, and criminology journals have recently begun 
publishing articles authored by economists; 
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• The conference that produced the papers in this volume, sponsored by CESifo as part of 
its annual meeting in Venice (2011), is one of several similar meetings in Europe in 
recent years that, like the NBER crime group and AL CAPONE, are helping create an 
international network of scholars. 
 
Of course, the social-scientific study of crime was well established by the time of Gary Becker’s 
contribution. Prior to that, from the 1920s onward, the dominant disciplines were sociology and 
psychology, and that continued to be the case as criminology departments and schools were 
established in the post-war period.  Becker chose to bypass rather than engage with that tradition, 
saying “…a useful theory of criminal behavior can dispense with special theories of anomie, 
psychological inadequacies, or inheritance of special traits and simply extend the economist’s 
analysis of choice (p. 170).”  With this bit of disciplinary imperialism as a guide, subsequent 
economics contributions tended to adopt the view that crime research was virgin territory, 
scarcely inhabited.  Economists were initially not so welcome in criminology, and for the most 
part were unconcerned about that fact, feeling that they had little to learn from the “natives.”  
Recently that separation between economics and criminology has begun to break down, a 
welcome trend that can be traced in part to the growth of multi-disciplinary public-policy 
programs and think tanks in the United States.2 
 
What have the economists contributed to the study of criminal behavior and crime control?  In 
what follows, to motivate and describe the contributions to this edited volume, we discuss three 
domains:   
 
• A normative framework for evaluating criminal law and crime prevention, and the 
application of sophisticated quantitative methods to analyze the causes of crime and the 
effects of crime-control measures in this framework; 
• The conception of criminal behavior as individual choice, influenced by perceived 
consequences;  
• The aggregation of individual choices to a systems framework for understanding crime 
rates and patterns. 
 
The papers in this volume are informed by and contribute to all of these domains. 
 
A. Policy choice and a normative framework 
 
During the tumultuous years of the 1960s, with riots in the cities and escalating rates of crime 
and drug abuse, the U.S. Congress created several high profile commissions to assess the 
underlying problems and recommend effective reforms.  When these commissions turned to the 
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prominent criminologists of the day, they offered their opinions but had little in the way of 
relevant evidence.  The political scientist James Q. Wilson was a critical observer of criminology 
at the time and observed that its sociological orientation did not lend itself to evidence-based 
policy recommendations (Wilson 1975). Crime was understood to be caused by culture and 
social structure. An analysis of these “root causes” of crime provided little guidance for 
policymakers, whose ability to change structural aspects of society was very limited.  Moreover, 
the sociologists were highly skeptical of the deterrence mechanism, denying or disregarding a 
role for the criminal justice system in controlling crime.  In Great Britain the disconnect between 
criminology and policy was perhaps even greater, since the dominant ethos dictated against 
policy engagement, in part because of its heavier focus on the social context of crime (Muncie, 
2005). 
 
Among the social sciences, economics tends to be best suited for addressing issues relevant to 
policy design.  The economic model presumes that observed behavior is not the inevitable result 
of underlying social conditions, but rather results from individual choices influenced by 
perceived consequences. If government policy can change those consequences, then behavior 
change will follow.  Furthermore, uniquely among the social and behavioral sciences, economic 
science incorporates a well-developed normative framework that defines the public interest and 
lends itself to policy prescription. 
 
Indeed, Becker’s contribution was primarily in the normative realm.  He pointed out that the 
social costs associated with crime are the sum of the direct costs of victimization (and the threat 
of victimization) and the indirect costs of efforts to control and prevent crime.  If the goal is to 
minimize total social costs, then the optimal amount of crime is unlikely to be zero, since at 
some point the marginal costs of additional prevention will exceed the marginal benefit of an 
additional reduction in crime.   
 
This simple and profound insight is relevant today in assessing progress against the crime 
“problem” in Western countries. Over the last 20 years crime rates have been relatively stable or 
falling in most European countries and declining in the United States (Buonanno et al. 2011).  In 
the United States the decline has been associated with an increase in public and private 
expenditure on prevention and control (Cook and Ludwig 2011), most notably (but by no means 
limited to) in the form of the burgeoning prison population. Whether the total social costs have 
been going down is thus an open question, since the increasing costs of control and avoidance 
may make up for the falling direct costs. 
 
The normative framework also provides guidance for evaluating specific interventions.  The 
economic question is not limited to “what works?” in crime control, but “what is worthwhile?”  
Cost-benefit analysis provides a set of rules for answering that question, and more generally 
encourages a comprehensive approach to evaluation.  An example in this volume is Emily 
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Owen’s article on the COPS program, which provides federal funding in the United States to 
some jurisdictions for hiring additional police officers.  The question of whether the additional 
officers had an effect on crime rates is surely of interest, but if the answer is yes there remains 
the question of whether it passes the cost-benefit test.  She expands the discussion to consider the 
arrest rate, since arrests and subsequent court processing generate public costs.  (The fact that she 
finds that arrest rates actually decline along with crime rates strengthens the case that COPS is 
cost-beneficial.3)  
 
The economist’s normative framework also provides guidance on the appropriate scope of the 
criminal law.  The tradition of consumer sovereignty, informed by the utilitarian perspective that 
measures the public interest as the sum of individual preferences, engenders a skeptical view of 
sumptuary laws of all kinds.  The chapter in this volume on drug policy by John Donohue notes 
that Nobel laureate Milton Friedman was a passionate advocate for legalization of marijuana, 
heroin, and other drugs, in part because of his belief that individual adults were the best judge of 
their own best interests.  That perspective does not settle the issue for most observers, including 
most economists; for one thing, commodities that are both harmful to the user and addictive 
(such as heroin, crack-cocaine, alcohol and tobacco) pose a particularly stringent test of the 
utilitarian perspective. Do we really believe that youths who are deciding to shoot up or smoke 
have their own best lifetime interests in mind?  If yes, then the damage they end up doing to their 
health and careers should not be a concern of government policy.  Even starting with a more 
equivocal view, the economic normative framework helps organize a comprehensive accounting 
scheme for determining which costs and benefits to consider. Given current practice, the costs of 
criminalization and enforcement loom large, which motivates a search for more efficient means 
of controlling use and abuse. 
 
Evaluation and study of criminal activities in this normative framework has recently been greatly 
enhanced by two phenomena which economists of crime have been the first to fully integrate 
into their research approach: (i) the significant improvement in data availability and data quality; 
and (ii) implementation of creative statistical methods to directly study causal relations in crime 
and crime control.  
 
Increased access to high quality data has greatly improved the potential to empirically, and more 
accurately, study the link between criminal participation and other factors that have theoretically 
been identified to influence its prevalence. Recorded police crime statistics have historically 
been one of the main sources of data used by researchers. It is very useful to look at crime rates 
over time and across areas when studying if these have been affected by the introduction of a 
localized policy initiative. Arrests, and other CJS data, have also been extensively exploited 
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since they has the advantage of providing some basic information on the characteristics of the 
offenders (e.g. age, gender, ethnicity). This enables studies to focuses on the offending rates of 
certain population sub-groups of interest that may react differently to stimuli that may 
affectcriminal participation. Researchers can also consider how certain policies or exogenous 
shocks affected the crime rates of particular cohorts or of individuals in certain areas using arrest 
information.  
 
The latest development in data collection has been the matching of individual administrative 
criminal datasets with other data sources containing information on offender characteristics such 
as education and employment of very large samples of the population. This will for example 
enable research into the complex dynamics between labour market opportunities and criminal 
participation at the individual level to emerge in the very near future.4 
 
The papers in this volume use or make reference to the very wide array of data sources available 
across the world to carry out research into the causes of offending used today. Over and above 
data related advances, they also all emphasise the importance of a solid and coherent 
methodology to test the validity of the normative framework.  
 
The other important feature of the application of the normative framework has been the  
contribution by economists of using advanced and innovative statistical methods. The first wave 
of econometric studies of deterrence using aggregate data (Ehrlich 1973; Sjoquist 1973; Carr-
Hill and Stern 1973) utilized complex multi-equation multivariate models estimated by two-stage 
least squares – at about the same time that criminologists were publishing the results of simple 
correlations on the same topic.  Still, the first wave of econometric research was effectively 
critiqued by an expert panel of the National Research Council (Blumstein, Cohen and Nagin 
1978) and others (Cook 1977).  The essential problem was the lack of plausibly exogenous 
instrumental variables on which to anchor a causal analysis of non-experimental data. As 
economics has increasingly embraced the use of natural and field experiments, economists have 
produced more robust findings on the causes of crime. One of the leaders in the creative use of 
plausibly exogenous variation to identify crime causation is Stephen Levitt, whose research (and 
emergence as a celebrity, thanks to his book Freakonomics) has done much to inspire subsequent 
cohorts of graduate students in economics (Ayres and Levitt 1998; Levitt, 1996, 1997, 2004 
2005) 
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6 
 
When it comes to empirical methods, the leading edge for economics and criminology has 
converged in recent years.  “Experimental criminology” is thriving and cuts across disciplines.5 
In this volume, the chapter by Jens Ludwig, Jeffrey R. Kling, and Sendhil Mullainathan 
discusses the agenda for policy experiments in crime control. Their theme is relevant to 
experimental work in criminology as well as economics. The ultimate objective of policy 
experiments is to discover what works and what is worthwhile. Testing innovative interventions 
through field experiments is vitally important if we are to have the possibility of evidence-based 
policy.  However, the authors point out that policies or programs are usually quite complex, and 
their effectiveness may be mediated by a variety of factors specific to time and place.   
 
What we can learn from a policy experiment, then, may be less than meets the eye – even a clear 
demonstration that a complex program implemented by a particular agency in a given 
environment is cost-effective (in comparison with the status quo) may leave considerable 
uncertainty about whether a similar policy would be effective, let alone worthwhile, if 
implemented by another agency in a different jurisdiction.  For that reason it is important to 
focus the empirical research agenda on the basic mechanisms that influence crime rates.  For 
example, if it can be established that the deterrent effect of punishment is more sensitive to the 
probability of punishment than the severity of punishment (as many of us suspect), then policy 
innovations that increase the probability of punishment will have a better prognosis than those 
that increase the severity of punishment.  The authors point out that there may be tradeoffs in 
experimental design between whether the intervention is realistic (something that might be 
implemented) and isolating a particular mechanism for evaluation.  Nevertheless, causal research 
focused on basic mechanism may produce generalizable knowledge of the sort most needed in 
policy design. 
 
B. Crime as a rational choice 
 
A simplistic but common understanding of crime is that the population can be divided neatly into 
two groups, good guys and bad guys.  In this view, the bad guys commit crime unless they are 
incapacitated, and the good guys are reliably law abiding.  This view had particular sway as an 
explanation for the surge of youth violence in the United States during the decade beginning in 
1984. The sociologist John DiIulio, together with William Bennett (a member of President 
Reagan’s cabinet), asserted that the surge was due to the growing ranks of remorseless killers, 
“superpredators” who grew up in poor, violence-ridden neighborhoods and broken homes.  In 
effect, then, the claim was that the surge in murder was the direct result of a surge in the number 
of bad guys (Cook and Laub 2002).  The only recourse appeared to be locking up as many of 
these superpredators as possible, and indeed most states changed their laws to facilitate 
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sentencing teenage felons to long prison terms (Dodge 2008).  As it turned out there was no 
scientific basis for the “superpredator” claim.  The evidence points strongly to environmental 
factors, and the leading contender in that regard is the crack epidemic. However, the 
“superpredator” claim was appealing in its simplicity and its veneer of social science. 
 
The economic model of crime shifts the focus from character to the choices that are available to 
the individual.  While certain aspects of character (or “preferences”) are surely not irrelevant, 
criminal activity represents a choice, or set of choices, that is available to everyone.  The choice 
of whether to commit crime is driven by the consequences, which differ among individuals 
depending on the opportunities available to them. For example, a school dropout will have 
relatively poor opportunities to earn a legitimate living, but lack of schooling is no barrier to 
larceny or robbery. For that reason alone we expect dropouts to be over-represented among 
active criminals. One type of formal economic model has treated criminal opportunities as 
gambles, with a payoff if successful and some probability of failure entailing arrest and 
punishment.  If the threatened punishment includes a prison term, or stigma that reduces access 
to good jobs, then the effect will be greater for those with good legitimate prospects.  An 
alternative approach has modeled crime as analogous to work, an activity that competes in use of 
time with other activities (Ehrlich 1973), but with a risky set of consequences.   
 
This perspective leads naturally to a presumption of deterability – that crime rates will be 
inversely related to the likelihood and severity of punishment.  However, the economic model 
also incorporates the idea that programs to improve legitimate opportunities may have a deterrent 
effect through increasing the opportunity cost of time spent in criminal activity or in prison.  
People with something to lose are less likely to view criminal participation as attractive and 
crime reductions can therefore be achieved by influencing the life opportunities of potential 
offenders. Some recent papers, Lochner and Moretti (2004), Machin et al. (2011) and 
Hjalmarsson et al. (2012), have for example shown that education has a large crime reducing 
effect on cohorts of individuals that were forced to stay longer at school because of changes in 
minimum school leaving age legislation. 
 
So what happened to cause the epidemic increase in youth violence in the United States during 
the crack era?  As noted, an explanation in terms of the number of “bad guys” does not fit the 
basic facts.6 The economic perspective encourages an explanation in terms of an upward shift in 
the payoff to gun violence.  That may indeed have been the case, as the introduction of crack into 
cities had the effect of disrupting established drug distribution networks and creating new 
contests over turf that in the United States (unlike other countries). 
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The economic focus on choices and consequences does not preclude the possibility that character 
(or what economists are inclined to call “preferences”) is also important in influencing criminal 
involvement.  The potential importance of changing preferences is suggested by the very strong 
relationship between criminal involvement and age; the age profile of crime commission declines 
steeply after age 20 or so, a pattern that may reasonably be interpreted as reflecting changing 
preferences (brain development, hormones) associated with the aging process -- although aging 
is not a well-controlled experiment.  More specifically, some crime reduction programs focus 
directly on changing preferences, for example therapeutic interventions intended to reduce 
craving for illicit drugs.   
 
Efforts to rehabilitate criminals may focus either on increasing the quality of legitimate 
opportunities (typically by improving human capital or clearing away barriers to earning a 
legitimate living), or on changing cognitive processes and capacities, such as self-control, 
empathy, and rationalization. While there have been myriad evaluations of specific programming 
intended to reduce recidivism rates, there remains considerable uncertainty about the overall 
effect of a spell of imprisonment on subsequent behavior. Aurélie Ouss reviews the contributions 
of economists to this literature, finding a surprising agreement that longer prison terms tend to 
reduce recidivism rates. Another chapter, by Stefan Pichler and Daniel Rőmer, presents new 
results on recidivism rates by German youths age 18-20, finding that those who are sentenced as 
juveniles tend to have higher recidivism rates than those who are sentenced as adults (with 
greater use of prison).  The mechanism by which prison time affects post-release recidivism rates 
is not clear.  It is possible that the actual experience of incarceration changes perceptions about 
the likelihood or severity of future sanctions. But there are numerous other ways in which the 
regimentation and social interactions of prison life might influence character or post-release 
opportunity. 
 
Crime as a rational choice has recently been applied to understand the behavioural response of 
anever wider variety of agents facing criminal participation decisions and of the institutions who 
aim to prevent offending. In his chapter to this volume, Mikael Priks argues that this framing 
also serves to explain the activities of certain sports fans of who are involved in violent 
activitieswhich may at first appear relatively puzzling. He discusses how his research into what 
he labels ‘hooliganomics’ shows that agents affiliated to sports booster clubs are as any rational 
agents and will respond to (dis)incentives influencing crime participation..  He makes here the 
interesting argument that the club may provide some check on its members’ hooliganism, 
depending on the composition of membership.  If the hooliganism-prone members come to 
dominate, then the internal regulation of behavior may erode.7 
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C.  Feedbacks and interactions 
 
Economics is a social science.  The theory of individual behavior serves as a building block for a 
theory of aggregate outcomes: the wealth of nations, or quantity and price in a specific market.  
The aggregation of individual choices in the context of a complex system can produce some 
surprising results – for example, that in a competitive industry, the individual producers’ pursuit 
of profit maximization drives down prices to the point where there is no profit to be made.  With 
respect to crime patterns, there can also be counter-intuitive results.  For example, it is interesting 
to observe that vulnerable population groups sometimes have relatively low crime victimization 
rates; the “little old ladies” living in the inner city are rarely robbed because they have adapted to 
the threat by hiding out at home behind locked doors (Cook 1986). 
 
The interacting systems that connect crime-related choices by individuals to aggregate outcomes 
(aggregate rates and patterns) have not been fully worked out by economists, but the literature 
provides a start on this project.  Criminal activity may be viewed as produced by individuals 
(active criminals) at a rate that is limited by the activities of the criminal justice system and 
private security measures.8  The electorate chooses  through the political process how many 
public resources to devote to the criminal justice system, and private households and businesses 
make myriad individual choices about how much private effort to devote to crime prevention and 
avoidance.  A further complication is that the effectiveness of the criminal justice system is very 
much dependent on private (often voluntary) inputs, such as reporting crimes and providing 
information and testimony during investigations.   
 
There are at least three noteworthy feedback loops in this system.  First, the capacity of the 
criminal justice system to control crime may be diluted by an exogenous increase in crime rates, 
which then causes a reduction in the likelihood or severity of punishment – resulting in further 
increases in the crime rate.  Second, an exogenous increase in the crime rate may raise the 
political salience of crime, leading to increased criminal-justice budgets and stricter sentencing, 
which may then rein in the crime rate.  And third, an exogenous increase in crime may induce 
greater private efforts at prevention and avoidance of criminal victimization, including actions 
ranging from locking up valuables and carrying a weapon, to hiring guards or relocating 
commercial activity to safer neighborhoods.  These private responses can in turn either 
exacerbate or curtail the crime increase, depending on the specifics.  The first two loops of this 
conceptualization were incorporated in the econometric models of the first wave of modern 
crime studies (cited above). The third loop, that makes private prevention efforts endogenous, 
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was introduced soon thereafter (Ehrlich 1981; Cook 1986), but has been largely neglected in the 
economics literature.   
 
Observed crime rates are thus the outcome of a complex interactive system, which may frustrate 
the goal of making unambiguous predictions, or even keeping track of all the relevant 
mechanisms.  A case in point is understanding or predicting how immigration affects crime rates.  
The first pass might be to ask “are these immigrants law-abiding people?”  (a question that harks 
back to the notion, discussed above, that crime rates are proportional to the number of bad 
people).  A more sophisticated inquiry would attempt to assess the public and private resources 
available for crime control and prevention in immigrant communities, and the likely spillovers to 
other communities.  (Note that the immigrants are both users and contributors to these 
resources.)  A still more comprehensive analysis would include the effects of the immigrant 
groups on labor markets (typically at the low-wage end of the spectrum), since immigrants may 
crowd out natives and reduce their incentive to choose a law-abiding path.  In their contribution 
to this volume, Brian Bell and Stephen Machin conclude that empirical evidence on the effect of 
immigration on crime is scanty, but suggestive that immigration by groups that have a weak 
connection to the labor market may increase property-crime rates. 
 
In most models of criminal activity, the perpetrators are not organized, and unconcerned about 
their individual effect on public or private control systems.  But of course some criminal activity 
is organized and hence subject to the management of whatever system of control exists within 
the criminal organization.  Economists have not yet paid much attention to criminal gangs, with 
the partial exception of the Mafia (Reuter 1983).  Nobel Laureate Thomas Schelling (1967) was 
the first to point out that the business of organized crime – the Mafia -- is not to provide illicit 
goods and services to the public, but rather to gain control and extort money from such 
providers.  The resulting cartel position in the provision of vice and other contraband actually 
creates an incentive to restrict supply in order to preserve prices (Buchanan 1973), which may 
seem like a good outcome from the public interest perspective, despite the lethal tactics used to 
acquire and preserve that monopoly. One problem is that the wealth and power of the 
organization is used to corrupt public officials as well limit the activities of the private suppliers 
of vice.  In his contribution to this volume, Paulo Pinotti provides empirical evidence that the 
influence of the Mafia in some areas of Italy extends deep into the political process, affecting the 
quality of candidates who run for office as well as the amount budgeted for easily corrupted 
public-works projects. 
 
Among the feedback effects that have figured importantly in crime research is through the 
political process, which translates public concern about crime into resource allocation to the 
criminal justice system.  The influence of crime rates on police budgets is well documented, as 
shown in the chapter by Paolo Buonanno and Giovanni Mastrobuoni. Interestingly, they find that 
police hiring in the United States is more responsive to changes in crime than is true in Italy, 
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where hiring and deployment decisions are nationally centralized and subject to perhaps more 
red tape than in the United States.  Another potential mechanism that links policing to crime is 
the process of learning and innovation.  Priks observes that the police response to hooliganism by 
soccer fans has evolved in some jurisdictions, where the police have learned that targeting 
individuals for arrest and prosecution is a more effective strategy than the traditional crowd-
control approach (using water cannons and the like).  Despite its evident advantages, this 
selective approach has not yet been adopted everywhere.  
   
The learning and innovation process in policing may well be subject to political pressure brought 
by public concern about crime, just as is the resource allocation process.  Rodrigo Soares and 
Igor Viveiros describe the effort to reform policing in Minas Gerais, the second largest state in 
Brazil, under pressure from a surge in crime rates beginning in the mid-1990s.  The police 
functions in Minas Gerais (as in other states) are divided between the Military Police, 
responsible for patrol and the immediate response to crime, and the Civil Police, which is 
responsible forinvestigations and general assistance to the judiciary. The lack of coordination 
between these two forces reduces effectiveness and efficiency. The government of Minas Gerais 
was able to overcome bureaucratic inertia and institute a plan of integration and improved 
communication beginning in 2005.  The results for crime control appear to be favorable. 
 
 
D.  Concluding thoughts 
 
The economists are here to stay in the study of crime, the criminal justice system, and crime 
prevention. The economists have brought with them a strong presumption that criminal behavior 
can be usefully modeled using the same conceptual apparatus that economic science has 
developed for risky decision making, labor supply, consumer and firm behaviour, and even 
market structure and performance.  Criminal law and crime-prevention programs can be 
evaluated using the same normative apparatus that is routinely applied to education, health, and 
environmental regulation. Of course the rules of statistical inference require no modifications. In 
short, crime is another choice, as Gary Becker suggested in 1968, and crime research using 
standard economic methods can be productive. 
 
Our entrance into this arena, led by Gary Becker and Thomas Schelling in the late 1960s, did not 
lead to immediate assimilation into the field of criminology, and in fact the differences in agenda 
and conceptual frameworks initially produced a good deal of antagonism.  But it is fair to say 
that the trend is toward greater mutual influence and respect.  The topics and references of 
chapters in this volume reflect the increasingly eclectic approach of economists, and increasing 
respect for contributions by others social scientists.  Those trends are welcome, and offer hope 
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